Snapshot of Trade Secret Developments by Rowe, Elizabeth A
University of Florida Levin College of Law
UF Law Scholarship Repository
UF Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2019
Snapshot of Trade Secret Developments
Elizabeth A. Rowe
University of Florida Levin College of Law, rowe@law.ufl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
kaleita@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth A. Rowe, Snapshot of Trade Secret Developments, 60 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. Online 45 (2019)
SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS
ELIZABETH A. ROWE*
TABLE OF CONTENTSINTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47I. CIVIL CASE REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50A. What Is Generally Known & Readily Ascertainable? . . . . . 52B. Failure to State a Claim? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53C. Identification & Pleading with Specificity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55D. Reasonable Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58E. Independent Economic Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59F. Preliminary Injunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61G. Misappropriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62H. Non-Competes and Other Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66I. Protective Orders and Requests to Seal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67J. Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72K. Permanent Injunctive Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76L. DTSA Whistleblower Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78II. CRIMINAL UPDATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81A. Convictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831. Former DuPont Employee Pleads Guilty . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832. Jury Convicts Electrical Engineer for Theft from Defense Contractor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833. Sinovel Convicted and Fined for Theft from AMSC . . . . 844. Former Chemours Employee Pleads Guilty . . . . . . . . . . . 84
* Irving Cypen Professor of Law, Distinguished Teaching Scholar, University TermProfessor, and Director, Program in Intellectual Property Law, University of Florida LevinCollege of Law. I express my appreciation to Victoria Cundiff and to participants at the 2018American Intellectual Property Lawyers Association Annual Meeting for insights, comments,or conversations about the ideas expressed in earlier versions of this work. Thank you toAlexandra Beguiristain, Anisha Dutt, and Alexandra Graves for research assistance and tothe University of Florida Levin College of Law for its research support.45
46 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:0455. Scientist Convicted for Theft of Engineered Rice . . . . . . . 856. Developer Pleads Guilty and Sentenced to Five Years in Prison. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857. Former Executive Convicted for Trade Secret Theft from Medical Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868. Chicago Trader Convicted for Theft of His Employer’s Trading Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869. Engineer Pleads Guilty to Selling Secrets to Russian Spy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87B. Indictments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871. Six Former and Current Fitbit Employees Indicted . . . . 872. Former Apple Employee Indicted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883. Man Arrested for Attempting to Steal Trade Secrets from Medrobotics Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894. Man Indicted for Stealing Trade Secrets to Benefit Rival Firm in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895. Russian Officers Charged for Hacking Yahoo Email Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906. Chinese Hackers Charged for Intrusions Against Moody’s, Siemens, and Trimble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 47
INTRODUCTIONTrade secret law protects facts, ideas, inventions and information.A trade secret can be any information of value used in one’s busi-ness that has been kept secret and provides an economic advantageover competitors.1 Because companies invest millions of dollars inresearch, development, and other aspects of their business thatprovide their competitive edge,2 they rely on the protections pro-vided under trade secret law as an incentive to invest the resourcesto create trade secrets, and to share those secrets with employees.3Trade secret protection is attractive, relative to other kinds of in-tellectual property protection, in part because of the broad scope ofinformation that is protectable and the relative ease with which abusiness can claim such protection.4 Securing trade secret infor-mation is the most critical task for any putative trade secret holderbecause once a trade secret has been disclosed, even if inadver-tently, it ceases to be a trade secret.5Trade secrets are arguably more important now to companiesthan ever in our history. In fact, since the most recent revisions toour patent laws, many believe that trade secrets might be even moreimportant than patents.6 Accordingly, the theft of trade secrets or
1. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005);RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 2. See generally JERRY COHEN & ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION ANDEXPLOITATION 12-13 (Bureau of Nat’l Affairs ed., 1998).3. See id. at 5-13; see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK ANDRELATED STATE DOCTRINES 152-53 (2d ed. 1981).4. See Brooks W. Taylor, You Can’t Say That!: Enjoining Publication of Trade SecretsDespite the First Amendment, 9 COMPUT. L. REV. & TECH. J. 393, 394-95 (2005) (discussingreasons why corporations rely on trade secret protection).5. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and TradeSecret Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 376n.53, 379 (2002). While the risk of loss is one that is inherent in choosing this form ofprotection, it does not necessarily suggest that a trade secret owner should have insteadchosen patent protection. See id. at 379-81. One who chooses trade-secret protection overpatent protection has not necessarily forgone a “better” form of protection, especially sincethere is a wide range of information that is eligible for trade-secret protection but not patentprotection. See, e.g., id.; see also JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 3.01[1] [a] at 3-4 (CharlesTait Graves 2007) (1997).6. See, e.g., David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets are IncreasinglyImportant, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1104-06 (2012); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising
48 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045trade secret misappropriation from company employees and fromoutsiders, such as competitors and foreign governments, is on therise.7The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) codifies the basic prin-ciples of common law trade secret protection.8 With Massachusetts’srecent adoption (effective October 1, 2018),9 a total of forty-ninestates, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. VirginIslands have adopted the UTSA (with some variation).10 The onlystate that has not yet adopted the UTSA in some form is NewYork.11After over one hundred years of trade secrecy being the only areaof intellectual property (IP) governed by state law, the most sig-nificant development to this area of law was the passage of theDefend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA).12 President Obama signedthe DTSA, and it went into effect on May 11, 2016.13 The DTSA isthe first federal law in the United States to create a federal civilcause of action for trade secret misappropriation.14 The DTSAlargely mirrors the UTSA, with a nearly identical definition of“trade secret,” an identical definition of “misappropriation,” andother similarities.15 Significantly, the DTSA does not preempt ordisplace state law (except, in some respects), meaning that the
Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 330 (2008); Tom C.W.Lin, Executive Trade Secrets, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 943 (2012).7. See, e.g., Almeling, supra note 6, at 1099-100, 1105, 1110-12. 8. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).9. Jacob W. Schneider & Taylor Han, Exploring the Pre-Disocovery Trade Secret Identi-fication Requirement in Massachusetts and Across the Country, HOLLAND & KNIGHT: TRADESECRETS BLOG (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.hklaw.com/TradeSecretsBlog/Exploring-the-Pre-Discovery-Trade-Secret-Identification-Requirement-in-Massachusetts-and-Across-the-Country-11-20-2018/ [https://perma.cc/R7UM-AL9Z]. 10. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.nccusl.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act [https://perma.cc/SFU2-BGHD].11. See id. North Carolina is often counted among the states that have adopted the UTSAbecause it enacted a statute that is similar. However, because of certain modifications, theUniform Law Commissioners does not recognize North Carolina as an official adoptee. SeeTrade Secrets Law and the UTSA: 50 State and Federal Law Survey, BECK REED RIDEN (Jan.24, 2017), https://www.beckreedriden.com/trade-secrets-laws-and-the-utsa-a-50-state-and-federal-law-survey-chart/ [https://perma.cc/UPY5-4Z79].12. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376, 380-82, 384-85(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832-1836, 1838-1839 (Supp. IV 2016)).13. See §§ 1832-1836, 1838-1839.14. See id. 15. Id. § 1839.
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 49United States now has two bodies of civil trade secret law develop-ing in parallel: the DTSA and the UTSA.16The DTSA’s enactment means that trade secret owners may nowbring a trade secret claim in state or federal court, a choice that waspreviously available only if they could invoke the diversity jurisdic-tion of the federal courts or join their state trade secret claim withanother federal cause of action.17 Since the DTSA is largely basedupon the UTSA, and is likely to be interpreted in accordance withthe UTSA; the existence of two separate trade secret laws is notlikely to result in significant divergence of state and federal tradesecret principles, for most of the country.As we enter the second year of the DTSA, this Article presents asnapshot of developments to assess whether there appears to be anysignificant doctrinal changes afoot in trade secret litigation—including civil and/or criminal—during the past year. ProfessorsDavid Levine and Christopher Seaman provided some empiricaldata and quantitative analysis of the case filings during the firstyear of litigation under the DTSA (from May 2016 to May 2017).18This Article complements their excellent work by taking a qualita-tive look at some of the substantive rulings from the following year.My assessment based on this limited sampling is that there does notappear to be any dramatic changes to the doctrinal development ofthe law to date.19 Rather, courts continue to search for fairness asthey struggle with problems common to trade secret litigationregarding, for instance, trade secret identification, misappropria-tion, and damages.20Further contributing to the uniqueness of trade secret law is that,given the evolution of trade secrecy from its state-based, commonlaw origins, it is probably more nuanced and inconsistent than itsother federal-law-based IP siblings (patents, trademarks, and
16. See id. § 1838.17. See id. § 1836.18. See David S. Levine & Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at One: An Empirical Studyof the First Year of Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV.105, 123-151 (2018).19. See infra Parts I, II; see generally SHARON K. SANDEEN & ELIZABETH A. ROWE, TRADESECRET LAW: INCLUDING THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT OF 2016 IN A NUTSHELL (WestAcademic 2d ed., 2018).20. See infra Parts I.C, I.G, I.J. 
50 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045copyrights).21 Trade secret law is highly factual.22 Every state isdifferent, and the trade secrecy law is based upon and supported bythe public policy of the relevant states.23 Nevertheless, the funda-mental principles of trade secrecy have become relatively wellgrounded, so much so that the introduction of a federal law is un-likely to cause tremendous upheaval in its continuing doctrinaldevelopment.24 Of course, it is far too soon to know what will happenin the years ahead, and there are specific provisions from the DTSAthat will require judicial interpretation.25This Article proceeds in four parts. Following this introduction,Part I highlights some noteworthy civil cases from select federal andstate courts. The cases are organized topically to provide the readerwith a quick overview of recent rulings in various categories, fromstating a claim for trade secret misappropriation to discovery-re-lated issues, including protective orders, as well as damages andinjunctive relief. Furthermore, to the extent some of the cases haveinterpreted certain provisions of the DTSA, those cases are notedseparately. In Part II, the Article includes updates on criminalconvictions and indictments over the past year under the EconomicEspionage Act. These “headlines” are intended to provide a flavor ofthe types of cases that are selected for criminal prosecution underfederal law. Finally, the Article concludes that there does notappear to be any significant departures in the civil case law to date,and that the criminal cases pursued by federal prosecutors continueto reflect familiar patterns.I. CIVIL CASE REVIEWThe majority of trade secret cases result from business relation-ships between the parties.26 In particular, most trade secret cases
21. See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101VA. L. REV. 317, 322-23 (2015).22. See id. at 363-64.23. See id. at 353.24. See id.; see also Levine & Seaman, supra note 18, at 119. 25. See Symposium, Understanding the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA): The Fed-eralization of Trade Secrecy, 50 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 331 (2017).26. See Levine & Seaman, supra note 18, at 131-32, 134-35. 
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 51arise in the employment context.27 Employers have the right toprotect and preserve trade secrets, confidential, and proprietaryinformation.28 When an employer discloses trade secrets in confi-dence to an employee during the course of his or her employment,even without an enforceable restrictive covenant, the employer hasa legitimate interest in protecting that information.29 However,careful consideration must be given to protecting trade secrets in away that does not unreasonably impinge on employees’ and otherusers’ rights.In addition to the employer-employee cases, many trade secretcases involve actions between competitors.30 One of the goals oftrade secret law is “the maintenance of standards of commercialethics.”31 Thus, while competition is a valued part of doing business,trade secret laws establish boundaries to ensure that this competi-tion is not done unfairly.32 It is just as unfair to hire the formeremployee of a competitor who will disclose the competitor’s tradesecrets, as it is to break into the competitor’s locked safe to steal itssecret formula.33 Accordingly, courts must strike the appropriatebalance between anti-competitive conduct and trade secret protec-tion in deciding trade secret cases.This Part provides an update on some of the civil trade secretcases that were decided in both federal and state courts this pastyear. Overall, it appears that most of these cases are still beingdecided under the UTSA, but some do include claims under both theUTSA and the DTSA.34 Cases that provided specific interpretationsof new provisions in the DTSA are noted at the end of the section.
27. See id. at 134-35. 28. See, e.g., New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 363 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Mass.1977); D.C. Wiring, Inc. v. Lamontagne, No. 91-1722, 1993 WL 818562, at *1-2 (Mass. Super.Ct. Dec. 20, 1993); Stevens & Co. v. Stiles, 71 A. 802, 805 (R.I. 1909).29. See, e.g., Stevens & Co., 71 A. at 805.30. See Levine & Seaman, supra note 18, at 122-23, 123 n.91. 31. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).32. See id. at 481-82. 33. Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is It Time to Restrain thePlaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1425, 1429-30 (2009). 34. Only five of the cases reviewed were based on DTSA claims. They are Xoran HoldingsL.L.C. v. Luick, No. 16-13703, 2017 WL 4039178 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2017); CPI Card Group,Inc. v. Dwyer, 294 F. Supp. 3d 791 (D. Minn. 2018); Broker Genius, Inc. v. Zalta, 280 F. Supp.3d 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Christian v. Lannett Co., No. CV 16-963, 2018 WL 1532849 (E.D. Pa.Mar. 29, 2018); and Hawkins v. Fishbeck, 301 F. Supp. 3d 650 (W.D. Va. 2017). 
52 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045A. What Is Generally Known & Readily Ascertainable?The definition of a trade secret under the UTSA and the DTSAspecifically precludes protection for information that is “generallyknown” or “readily ascertainable.”35 The phrase “generally known”is not defined by the UTSA or the DTSA, but the commentary to theUTSA and applicable case law recognizes that the concept is notlimited to information that is known by the public at large.36Information can be generally known and ineligible for trade secretprotection “[i]f the principal persons who can obtain economicbenefit from information are aware of it.”37 The “readily ascertain-able” limitation focuses on how easily a trade secret could be dis-covered if anyone attempted to do so from a source other than theputative trade secret owner.38 The focus is on whether the informa-tion is “knowable.”39HIP, Inc. v. Hormel Foods Corp. from the Eighth Circuit serves asa reminder that information disclosed in a patent application cannotbe a trade secret.40 Such information becomes public knowledge, andas such, it is excluded from coverage under the definition of “confi-dential” information for the purposes of the nondisclosure agree-ment at issue in the case.41A plaintiff who claimed that its business strategy of marketingits products through QVC was a trade secret could not sustain itsclaim.42 In Yeiser Research & Dev. L.L.C. v. Teknor Apex Co., thecourt noted that a competitor could easily ascertain this informationthrough public sources.43 This included a business strategy regard-
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (Supp. IV 2016).36. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); see alsoBroker Genius, Inc., 280 F. Supp. at 513-14, 516-17.37. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 38. See id.39. Id. § 2 cmt.40. 888 F.3d 334, 341 (8th Cir. 2018).41. See id. at 341-42. 42. See, e.g., Yeiser Research & Dev. L.L.C. v. Teknor Apex Co., 281 F. Supp. 3d. 1021,1046 (S.D. Cal. 2017). 43. 281 F. Supp. 3d at 1046-49.
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 53ing when and where plaintiff sold its products.44 Accordingly, theplaintiff could not establish the existence of a trade secret.45The Nevada Supreme Court in MEI-GSR Holdings, L.L.C. v.Peppermill Casinos, Inc., was asked to determine whether, underthe Nevada Uniform Trade Secrets Act,46 a defendant is precludedfrom demonstrating that certain information was readily ascertain-able if the defendant acquired the information through impropermeans.47 Interpreting the statute, the court held that the determina-tion of whether information was “readily ascertainable by propermeans” was “not limited to the defendant’s conduct.”48 Furthermore,the court noted:Although a defendant’s acquisition of information by propermeans is a relevant consideration in determining whether theinformation is a trade secret..., we hold that a defendant’sacquisition of information by improper means does not precludethe defendant from demonstrating that the information isreadily ascertainable by other persons.49Thus, whether information is readily ascertainable or generallyknown is a threshold inquiry in establishing that the type of in-formation at issue qualifies for trade secret protection or is pro-tectable as a trade secret.50B. Failure to State a Claim?In order to establish a claim for trade secret misappropriation un-der the UTSA and the DTSA, a plaintiff has the burden of pleadingand proving that: (1) plaintiff owns a trade secret; (2) one or moreof plaintiff’s trade secrets have been or are threatened to be misap-propriated by the defendant; and (3) plaintiff is entitled to a rem-edy.51 Because the available remedies are broad, the focus of trade
44. See id. 45. See id. 46. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600A.030 (West 2017).47. 416 P.3d 249, 253 (Nev. 2018).48. Id. at 254.49. Id.50. See, e.g., id. 51. See Clorox Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d, 954, 968 (E.D. Wisc. 2009)
54 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045secret misappropriation cases is usually on the first and second re-quirements.52 Generally, the determination whether specific infor-mation is a trade secret is a mixed question of law and fact.53Tension Envelope Corporation v. JBM Envelope Company fromthe Eighth Circuit raises the interesting question of whether in-formation created by a company’s customers can be protectableinformation.54 The plaintiff in this case alleged that it producedenvelopes that complied with technical specifications generated byits customers, not by the plaintiff itself.55 The Eighth Circuit heldthat because these customer requirements could have been acquiredfrom the customers themselves, the plaintiff failed to state a claimfor misappropriation of trade secrets.56In Krawiec v. Manly, the North Carolina Supreme Court consid-ered whether the plaintiff’s description of its trade secret wassufficient to allege the existence of a trade secret under the NorthCarolina Trade Secrets Protection Act.57 The plaintiff, a dancestudio, described its trade secrets as “original ideas and concepts fordance productions, marketing strategies and tactics, as well asstudent, client and customer lists and their contact information.”58The plaintiff provided no further details about these “ideas, con-cepts, strategies, and tactics” in order to put “defendants on noticeas to the precise information allegedly misappropriated.”59 Further-more, the court found that the complaint did not show that theplaintiff’s customer lists were trade secret because it failed to allegethat the list contained any information that would not be readilyaccessible to defendants.60 The plaintiff therefore needed to provideadditional information sufficient to put the defendants and the court
(listing the elements of a prima facie case for trade secret misappropriation under California’sversion of the UTSA).52. See infra Parts I.D, I.G; see also infra note 128 and accompanying text. 53. See, e.g., APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae, 985 F. Supp. 852, 864 (N.D. Iowa 1997).54. 876 F.3d 1112, 1122 (8th Cir. 2017).55. See id. at 1115-16.56. See id. at 1122-23.57. 811 S.E. 2d 542 (N.C. 2018); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 66-153 (West 2017)(outlining an action for misappropriation under the North Carolina Trade Secrets ProtectionAct). 58. Krawiec, 811 S.E. 2d at 549.59. See id. 60. See id.
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 55on notice as to which “ideas, concepts, strategies, and tactics” wereallegedly misappropriated.61C. Identification & Pleading with SpecificityIt is not until a trade secret holder is actually in litigation thatthe validity of its alleged trade secret rights are determined.62 Thefirst step in establishing the existence of a trade secret is to provethat the information in question was a trade secret before the de-fendant misappropriated it.63 This means that the plaintiff mustidentify the trade secret (precisely each piece of information theplaintiff alleges is a trade secret) and show that it took reasonableefforts to preserve this information.64 This often can be a challengefor most plaintiffs.65The plaintiff has a duty to identify its trade secrets with specific-ity.66 In most states, this requirement is imposed by case law andpleading rules, but in California it is a statutory requirement.67Similarly, the Wisconsin UTSA requires for injunctive relief “adescription of each alleged trade secret in sufficient detail to informthe party to be enjoined or restrained of the nature of the complaintagainst that party.”68 One reason for the specificity requirement isto prevent a plaintiff from using trade secret litigation as a meansto conduct competitive intelligence through the guise of discovery.69
61. Id. 62. See Rowe, supra note 33, at 1447.63. See id.; see also Robert A. Kearney, Why The Burden of Proving Causation ShouldShift to the Defendant Under the New Federal Trade Secret Act, 13 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 3-4(2016).The standard utilized for this inquiry should be akin to the likelihood of successon the merits standard used in preliminary injunction cases. Most trade secretcases, particularly in the context of the problem presented here, will be decidedat a preliminary injunction hearing. Thus, use of this standard should presentno further difficulty, and may very well fold into the injunction test.Rowe, supra note 33, at 1447 n.124. 64. See Rowe, supra note 33, at 1447. 65. See id. 66. See IDX Systems Corp. v. Epic Systems Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2002).67. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019.210 (West 2005).68. WISC. STAT. ANN. § 134.90(3)(a) (West 2011).69. See DeRubeis v. Witten Tech., Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 680 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
56 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045It also serves the due process purpose of letting defendants knowthe details of the claims against them.The obligation that trade secrets be identified with particularityis not merely a pleading or evidentiary requirement; it is a verypractical requirement. Unless the plaintiff can articulate its pu-tative trade secrets in a very concrete way, there is no way to testwhether the information meets the requirements for trade secrecy.This is often a challenge for trade secret owners who tend to claimtrade secrecy for broad or vague categories of information. By doingso, they may undermine their ability to show that the informationis not generally known and has independent economic value.70The Eleventh Circuit in EarthCam, Inc. v. OxBlue Corp., ad-dressed whether conclusory allegations are sufficient to withstanda motion for summary judgment.71 Even though the court ruled that“whether a particular type of information constitutes a trade secretis a question of fact,” conclusory allegations without specific sup-porting facts are insufficient to resist summary judgment.72 In thiscase, the district court had found that the rather general informa-tion contained in the defendant’s emails at issue contained tradesecrets.73 An affidavit supporting the plaintiff’s claim and declaringthat certain information “was not publicly available” and that itgave the plaintiff “a competitive advantage” without fleshing out thedetails was not enough.74 Another court reviewing confidential in-formation disclosed in emails by a former employee, also found that“generalized assertions” would not be sufficient to meet the plain-tiff’s burden of proving that it had legitimate trade secrets.75Similarly, in RE/MAX, LLC v. Quicken Loans Inc., the court dis-missed the defendant’s counterclaim for trade secret misappropri-ation as conclusory, because it did not provide sufficient facts tosupport its argument.76 For instance, the court reasoned that de-fendant simply states that:
70. See, e.g., Blake v. Prof. Coin Grading Serv., 898 F. Supp. 2d 365, 379 (D. Mass. 2012). 71. 703 F. App’x 803, 810 (11th Cir. 2017).72. See id. 73. See id. at 810-11.74. Id. at 811.75. See CPI Card Group, Inc. v. Dwyer, 294 F. Supp. 3d 791, 809 (D. Minn. 2018).76. 295 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1176 (D. Colo. 2018).
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 57[u]pon information and belief, [plaintiff] used and sharedconfidential information it obtained about [defendant’s] confi-dential, proprietary, and trade secret processes and marketingstrategies through the negotiation and implementation of theAgreement to develop, launch, and operate Motto Mortgage.While [defendant] alleges various reasons to suspect [plaintiff]was economically motivated to use [defendant’s] confidentialinformation for such a purpose, [defendant] does not allege anyfacts tending to show that it actually did use such information.77Thus, the court pointed out that the defendant did not allege any-thing about plaintiff’s operations that suggested it used defendant’sconfidential business information.78 Indeed, the court noted that theonly similarities that defendant alleges between its operations andplaintiff’s were the “superficial similarity that [plaintiff] is in thesame industry and the irrelevant claim that [plaintiff] ‘copied [de-fendant’s] slogan,’ which is not confidential.”79 Finding that theseallegations were insufficient to suggest a plausible inference thatthe defendant was harmed by the plaintiff’s use of its confidentialinformation, the court dismissed the counterclaim.80In Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gemma, however, the defendantswere unsuccessful in dismissing the complaint for lack of spec-ificity.81 Defendants argued that under the Pennsylvania UniformTrade Secrets Act,82 the complaint did not describe the alleged tradesecrets with sufficient specificity, or explain how the defendantsobtained the trade secrets, or used the trade secrets.83 The courtfound that the plaintiff alleged that defendants “misappropriatedvarious documents, including customer lists and other customerinformation.”84 Because misappropriation under the statute re-quires the “following elements: (1) the existence of a trade secret;(2) communication of the trade secret pursuant to a confidentialrelationship; (3) use of the trade secret, in violation of that confi-
77. Id. at 1173 (internal citations omitted).78. See id. 79. Id. 80. See id. 81. 301 F. Supp. 3d 523, 541 (W.D. Pa. 2018).82. 12 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301 (West 2004). 83. See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. at 540. 84. Id.
58 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045dence; and (4) harm to the plaintiff,” the court deemed the com-plaint to be sufficient.85D. Reasonable Efforts“In almost every state, the reasonable efforts requirement isembedded in the threshold legal question of trade secret misappro-priation analysis: whether the plaintiff owns a legally protectabletrade secret.”86 Reasonable efforts require that in order to qualify fortrade secret protection, the information must be “the subject ofefforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain itssecrecy.”87 The reasonable efforts requirement mandates that atrade secret holder “show more than mere intent to protect some-thing as a trade secret; actual effort to keep the information secretis necessary.”88Whether a trade secret owner has utilized appropriate safeguardssufficient to meet the reasonable efforts requirement is a questionof fact, based on the particular circumstances.89 Thus, the decisionsnecessitate a balancing between using sufficient precautions toprotect a company’s secret on the one hand, while not imposingoverly-burdensome precautions that would impair the functioningof its business on the other hand.90In CSS, Inc. v. Herrington, a software provider brought an actionagainst its former employee and competitor, alleging that thedefendants misappropriated a number of trade secrets, including itssource code.91 In considering the extent of measures taken to guardthe secrecy of the source code, the court found that the source codehad been installed on the county’s servers for about twenty years,
85. Id.86. Elizabeth A. Rowe, RATs, TRAPs, and Trade Secrets, 57 B.C. L. REV. 381, 409 (2006).87. See id. (quoting UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538(2005)). 88. Id.; see also Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901 (Minn.1983) (“[E]ven under the common law, more than an ‘intention’ was required—the plaintiffwas required to show that it had manifested that intention by making some effort to keep theinformation secret.”).89. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 176-77 (7th Cir.1991).90. See id. at 178-80. 91. 306 F. Supp. 3d 857, 864, 877 (S.D.W. Va. 2018).
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 59it was not encrypted, password-protected, or labeled confidential;nor did the plaintiff require any confidentiality agreements when itprovided the source code to its clients (the various counties).92Accordingly, the court concluded that the source code was not thesubject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy and thereforecould not be a trade secret.93The Southern District of NewYork in Broker Genius, Inc. v. Zalta,(applying the DTSA) similarly found that the plaintiff had not takenreasonable efforts to protect its software.94 The company regularlydisclosed its alleged trade secrets to its customers without requiringthem to sign confidentiality agreements.95 It gave “unfettered ac-cess” to the software, as well as extensive training, user manuals,and videos that explained how the software works and its func-tionalities.96 In light of these findings, the plaintiff was unable toshow that it took reasonable measures to protect the secrecy of theinformation.97E. Independent Economic ValueThe independent economic value requirement of trade secrecy isan often overlooked and misapplied part of the trade secrecyanalysis. Technically, the “value” that is required is not any valueviewed in the abstract, but a particular kind of value. The plaintiffin a trade secret misappropriation case has the burden of pleadingand proving that its putative trade secret: (1) “derives”; (2) “inde-pendent”; (3) “economic value, actual or potential”; (4) “from notbeing generally known or readily ascertainable by” (that is, frombeing secret); (5) “other persons who can obtain economic value fromits disclosure or use.”98The specifics of the economic value requirement are often givenonly brief attention by courts and litigants. Frequently, courts
92. See id. at 877-78.93. See id. at 878-79. 94. 280 F. Supp. 3d 495, 517-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).95. See id.96. See id. at 520. 97. See id. at 521-22. 98. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); see also 18U.S.C. § 1839 (Supp. IV 2016).
60 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045assume that the alleged trade secrets must have the requisiteeconomic value, otherwise the plaintiff would not have initiatedlitigation.99 Plaintiffs sometimes discount or obscure the require-ment in order to make it easier for them to prove their prima faciecase.Cy Wakeman, Inc. v. Nicole Price Consulting, L.L.C., addressedindependent economic value as it relates to secrecy.100 Here, theplaintiff alleged that the customer relationships between it andcertain clients were confidential.101 The court, interpreting Ne-braska’s UTSA, noted, however, that even if those relationshipswere sufficiently secret, it was unclear how they provided independ-ent economic value to others.102 According to the court, secrecy alonedoes not equal economic value.103 The plaintiff argued that the valuecreated by the secrecy of the plaintiff’s client lists is the businessthose clients generate, and that business would be lost if the plain-tiff was unable to maintain their privacy.104 “But that is just valueto [the plaintiff], and is not independent value. [Plaintiff] has iden-tified no one else who could obtain an economic advantage fromknowing who [plaintiff’s] confidential clients are.”105 Thus, the courtreasoned that there was no evidence that a competitor with knowl-edge of the plaintiff’s client relationships could reap economic valuejust from knowing them.106The Ohio Supreme Court in In re Review of Alternative EnergyRider Contained in Tariffs of Ohio Edison Co., in assessing whetherprotective orders were properly granted, engaged in an analysis ofindependent economic value.107 The relevant party in this case, autility company, had entered into confidentiality agreements with
99. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 521 (9th Cir. 1993)(holding that plaintiff’s customer database had potential economic value because it wouldallow competitors to direct efforts to potential customers already using the plaintiff’s services);Editions Play Bac, S.A. v. Western Pub. Co., No. 92 Civ. 3653 (JSM), 1993 WL 541219, at *7(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1993) (holding that the plaintiff’s alleged trade secret had economic valuebecause the defendant and another company considered licensing the rights to the secret). 100. 284 F. Supp. 3d 985, 995-96 (D. Neb. 2018).101. See id. at 995. 102. See id. at 995-96.103. See id. 104. See id. at 996.105. Id. 106. See id. 107. 106 N.E.3d 1, 9-10 (Ohio 2018). 
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 61its suppliers to prevent the disclosure of certain supplier and pricinginformation submitted during a competitive bid process.108 ThePublic Utilities Commission granted the protective orders, but theEnvironmental Law and Policy Center and the Office of the OhioConsumers Council challenged the protective orders and soughtdisclosure of the records.109 They argued that the information wasnot entitled to trade secret protection because, among other things,it did not meet the independent economic value requirement.110They further argued that the Public Utilities Commission did notexplain how the sealed information, in light of its age and changesin market conditions that have transpired over time, has retainedits economic value in today’s market.111 The Commission, on theother hand, asserted that “if [the] trade secret information waspublic, it could discourage REC suppliers’ confidence in the marketand impede the function of the REC market.”112 The court concludedthat “[w]hile trade secrets may continue to be protected if the in-formation retained some measure of value,” the Commission hadfailed to cite to specific evidence to explain its protective order.113F. Preliminary InjunctionsThe basic principles of injunctive relief that were developed atcommon law continue to be applied under the UTSA and DTSA.Generally, before a court grants a preliminary injunction, the plain-tiff must establish: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) asubstantial threat that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injuryif the injunction is denied; (3) that the balance of hardships favorsthe moving party; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve thepublic interest.114In Mercer Health & Benefits L.L.C. v. DiGregorio, the SouthernDistrict of New York granted a preliminary injunction enforcing
108. See id. at 8. 109. See id. at 7-8. 110. See id. at 9-10.111. See id. at 8.112. Id. at 10. 113. Id. 114. See Hull Mun. Lighting Plant v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 506 N.E.2d 140, 141-44 (Mass. 1987); Town of Brookline v. Goldstein, 447 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Mass. 1983).
62 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045nonsolicitation agreements and confidentiality agreements signedby the individual defendants relying on affirmative conduct by thedefendants.115 In granting the injunction, the court relied on thefollowing evidence:[T]he Individual Defendants met with [defendant’s] representa-tives repeatedly over a period of months while still employed [byplaintiff], and emailed confidential [plaintiff] documents to theirpersonal email accounts during the same period; orchestratedsimultaneous resignations from [plaintiff]; sent [plaintiff’s]clients targeted announcements of their move to [plaintiff’scompetitor]; sought and held meetings with several [plaintiff]clients after joining [the competitor]; and persuaded at least one[plaintiff] client ... to move its business to [the defendant].116On the other hand, in ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction,the court in Cerro Fabricated Products L.L.C. v. Solanick granted aninjunction even without such affirmative acts.117 The court reasonedthat even though the defendant, absent evidence that he took anydocuments with him, was likely to possess a significant amount ofconfidential information in his memory, he would still be capable of“compartmentalizing and confidential information” to avoid usingit with his new employer.118 Nevertheless, because defendants couldnot present any evidence of steps taken, or that they intended totake, in order to prevent the disclosure of the plaintiff’s trade se-crets, there was a sufficient likelihood of disclosure of the tradesecret.119 Accordingly, a preliminary injunction was warranted.120G. MisappropriationTo establish a claim for trade secret misappropriation under theUTSA and the DTSA, a plaintiff has the burden of pleading andproving that: (1) plaintiff owns a trade secret (or otherwise hasstanding to sue); (2) that one or more of plaintiff’s trade secrets have
115. 307 F. Supp. 3d 326, 330-31, 346-48, 350-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).116. Id. at 347.117. 300 F. Supp. 3d 632, 636 (M.D. Pa. 2018).118. See id. at 653. 119. See id. 120. See id. 
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 63been or are threatened to be misappropriated by the defendant; and(3) that plaintiff is entitled to a remedy.121 Because the availableremedies are broad, the focus of trade secret misappropriation casesis usually on the first and second requirements.122An aspect of trade secret law that makes it different from patent,copyright, and trademark law is its knowledge requirement.123 Thedefinition of misappropriation under all formulations of trade secretlaw requires that the defendant “knows or has reason to know” ofthe alleged trade secrets and the wrongful acts of misappropria-tion.124 In contrast, patent, copyright, and trademark laws are likestrict liability torts in that a defendant may be held liable forpatent, copyright, and trademark infringement even if he did notknow or have reason to know of the existence of plaintiff’s intellec-tual property rights.125How a plaintiff attempts to prove the requisite knowledge intrade secret cases depends upon the facts of each case, but directevidence of actual knowledge is not required.126 Knowledge or reasonto know can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.127 Of course,where a defendant directly engages in the wrongful acts that con-stitute misappropriation, the requisite knowledge of such acts isrelatively easy to prove.128 The key in such cases is to prove that the
121. See Clorox Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d, 954, 968 (E.D. Wis. 2009)(listing the elements of a prima facie case for trade secret misappropriation under California’sversion of the UTSA).122. See id. at 968-69. 123. See Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1401, 1404 (2014)(“To be liable for trade secret misappropriation, however, one must ‘missappropriate’ the pro-tected information....This requirement makes trade secret law unique and reflects how itsorigins differ from those of patent and copyrights laws.”). 124. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (Supp IV. 2012); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(i) (amended1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 40 (AM. LAWINST. 1995).125. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17BERKELY TECH. L.J. 799, 800-01 (2002); N. Coast. Indus. v. Jason Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1992) (“To establish copyright infringement, the holder of the copyrightmust prove both valid ownership of the copyright and that there was infringement of thatcopyright by the alleged infringer.”).126. See, e.g., Clorox Co., 627 F. Supp. 2d at 968-69. 127. See, e.g., id. 128. See, e.g., Beard Res., Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 599 (Del. Ch. 2010).
64 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045defendant knew or had reason to know that the information he ac-quired, disclosed, or used was trade secret information.129Circumstantial evidence can be presented and weighed to de-termine the likelihood that the defendant knew of the misappropria-tion, and a defendant cannot shield himself by “studious ignoranceof pertinent ‘warning’ facts.”130 A defendant’s constructive noticethat the information was a trade secret is sufficient.131In Experian Information Solutions, Inc. v. Nationwide MarketingServices Inc., the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the defendantknew or had reason to know that it acquired and used the tradesecret that was obtained through improper means.132 In reviewingthe District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the issue, thecourt noted that “improper acquisition and improper use of pro-tected works [were] independent bases” for trade secret misappro-priation.133 As an evidentiary matter, the defendant had “paid lessthan 1% of the market rate for a one-time license” in order to obtainownership of the data at issue.134 The court found that this indicatedsufficient knowledge and that the low price paid by the defendantsupported plaintiff’s contention that the defendant had constructiveknowledge that the data in question had been obtained throughimproper means.135 This evidence was sufficient to withstand sum-mary judgment.136In GE Betz, Inc. v. Moffitt-Johnston, the Fifth Circuit noted thatalthough circumstantial evidence is often relied upon to prove tradesecret misappropriation, in this case, a mere inference was not suf-ficient.137 Evidence of the defendant downloading company files,lying about working for a competitor, and suspicions of solicitingcompetitors at industry social events were too speculative to raisean issue of material fact.138 The plaintiff also argued that it was
129. See id. 130. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co., 407 N.E.2d 319, 324 (Mass.1980). 131. See id. 132. 893 F.3d 1176, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 2018).133. See id. at 1189. 134. See id. 135. See id. 136. See id. 1189-90. 137. 885 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2018).138. See id. at 322-24. 
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 65reasonable to infer from the defendant’s business plan that thedefendant used the plaintiff’s cost structure to acquire marketshare.139 Nevertheless, the court found that “attempting to acquiremarket share, even in part through lower margins, is a natural goalfor a business in its infancy, and it would be unreasonable to inferfrom this broadly stated objective that [the defendant] planned touse [the plaintiff’s] trade secrets.”140C.D.S., Inc. v. Zetler is a reminder of the importance of clearcontractual terms among business partners relating to ownershipof and access to proprietary information.141 The factual backgroundof this case spans almost a “dozen parties in the fashion technologybusiness and conduct that occurred on at least three continents.”142In interpreting the terms of a distributorship agreement betweenthe parties, the court found that, among other things, the agreementdid not grant the defendants any rights to the source code at issue,and as such, they could be liable for misappropriation.143 On theother hand, with respect to a customer list that was used by thedefendants in their sales efforts, the court found that the distribu-tion agreement did not prohibit such use by the defendants andcould not be misappropriation.144 The court also enforced the “bind-ing forum selection clause in favor of the French courts,” that wasprovided for in the agreement.145How much of an advantage must a trade secret provide to adefendant in order to constitute misappropriation? In Iconics, Inc.v. Massaro, the court held that the advantage does not need to besubstantial.146 “If a misappropriator uses a trade secret even to somesmall benefit, but fails to implement it in a way that maximizes itsvalue, it has still misappropriated the secret.”147 The court concludedthat a reasonable jury could find that the defendant’s implemen-tation was merely inferior to plaintiff’s, but that any advantage,
139. See id. at 326. 140. Id. 141. 298 F. Supp. 3d 727, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).142. Id. at 734. 143. See id. at 759. 144. See id. at 761. 145. Id. 146. 266 F. Supp. 3d 449, 460 (D. Mass. 2017).147. Id.
66 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045whether small or ephemeral, would still be enough to constitutetrade secret misappropriation.148In Elenza, Inc. v. Alcon Labs. Holding Corp., the Supreme Courtof Delaware evaluated whether it was sufficient that the defendanthad “motive and opportunity” to misappropriate a trade secret.149 Inthis case, the plaintiff attempted to show that the defendant had the“motive and opportunity” to misappropriate its trade secrets basedon the defendant’s collaboration with other third parties and thatthe defendant’s designs were “sufficiently similar” to plaintiff’sbased on the defendant’s patent application.150 The court found,however, that this was insufficient to give rise to an inference ofmisappropriation.151 It was not enough to show that they “couldhave” used the plaintiff’s designs. Instead, they needed to point toevidence in the patent application and elsewhere that the defendantactually did.152H. Non-Competes and Other AgreementsWhen employers wish to restrict employees from working forcompetitors, they should enter into written restrictive covenants(often labeled “Noncompetition Agreements” or “NoncompeteAgreements”) that are designed to protect their legitimate businessinterests.153 By entering into a noncompetition agreement, theemployee usually agrees that for a specified period of time, after theend of his or her employment, he or she will not work for anycompany that is a competitor of the employer.154Although it is too early after the adoption of the DTSA to havedefinitive guidance on how federal courts will interpret section1836(b)(3)(A)(i) of the DTSA, when cases allege violations of boththe DTSA and the state UTSA, many district courts seem to begranting injunctions restraining employees and other defendants
148. See id. 149. 183 A.3d 717, 725 (Del. 2018).150. Id.151. See id. at 725-26. 152. Id. at 726. 153. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Fishbeck, 301 F. Supp. 3d 650, 659-60 (W.D. Va. 2017). 154. See id. 
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 67from competing with the trade secret owner in much the same waythat they would have done under the UTSA.155Applying Virginia law, one district court held a noncompetitionagreement unenforceable in Hawkins v. Fishbeck.156 The agreementprovided that:During the term of this Agreement and for a period of twelve(12) months thereafter, Executive shall not, in any capacitywhatsoever, own, participate in the ownership of, manager [sic],operate, exercise any control over, render services to, derive in-come from or engage in any of the foregoing for any business,firm, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, orother entity which operates a business competitive with Em-ployer.157The court found the agreement overbroad for two reasons. First, itwent too far in restricting the roles that the employee could performfor a competitor by prohibiting work “in any capacity whatsoever.”158Second, the agreement contained no geographical limitation period,and could restrict the employee from working in an area where henever performed any functions for the former employer.159I. Protective Orders and Requests to SealBecause defendants in trade secret cases have the right to dis-cover the identification and details of the plaintiff’s putative trade
155. See, e.g., T&S Brass & Bronze Works, Inc. v. Slanina, No. 6:16-03687-MGL, 2017 WL1734362, at *13, *17 (D.S.C. May 4, 2017) (preliminary injunction granted despite an objectionthat it would prevent the defendant from entering into an employment relationship); First W.Capital Mgmt. Co. v. Malamed, No. 16-cv-1961-WJM-MJW, 2016 WL 8358549, at *6, *13 (D.Colo. Sept. 30, 2016) (preliminary injunction granted in a case where the moving partyappears to have carefully limited the requested injunction to avoid any problems under theDTSA, but where the injunction nonetheless prohibited the defendant from providing anyservices to plaintiff’s existing and prospective clients); Panera, L.L.C. v. Nettles, No. 4:16-cv-1181-JAR, 2016 WL 4124114, at *2, *6 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016) (temporary restraining orderissued to enforce a confidentiality and noncompete agreement and to protect plaintiff’s tradesecrets).156. See Hawkins, 301 F. Supp. 3d at 660-61. 157. Id. at 660 (emphasis added).158. See id. 159. See id. 
68 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045secrets,160 there is an obvious risk that whatever trade secrets existwill be revealed during the course of the litigation. As a practicalmatter, when presenting its case at trial, a plaintiff will have toexplain what its trade secrets are as part of its prima facie case.161To facilitate the discovery process, most courts will issue protectiveorders that are designed to protect plaintiff’s information during thependency of litigation.162 Indeed, both the UTSA and the DTSArequire courts to do so.163 Section 5 of the UTSA states:“[A] court shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret byreasonable means, which may include granting protective ordersin connection with discovery proceedings, holding in-camerahearings, sealing the records of the action, and ordering anyperson involved in the litigation not to disclose an alleged tradesecret without prior court approval.”164Generally, it is easier to protect trade secrets during the pleadingand discovery phases of litigation than it is during trial.165 This isbecause of the strong public policy favoring open and publicly ac-cessible judicial proceedings.166Accordingly, courts will sometimes restrict public access to courtproceedings in order to protect trade secrets, once the appropriateshowings have been made regarding trade secrecy status and thelack of other reasonable alternatives to protect the information.167Courts will also consider whether the parties to the litigation wouldsuffer competitive harm if their information were to be made pub-
160. See Brian D. Range, Identification of Trade Secret Claims in Litigation: Solutions fora Ubiquitous Dispute, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 68, 69, 71, 73 (2006).161. See Rowe, supra note 33, at 1447. 162. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 727 F.3d 1214, 1223-24, 1229 (Fed. Cir.2013).163. See 18 U.S.C. § 1835 (Supp. IV 2016); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 5 (amended 1985),14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).164. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 5.165. See, e.g., Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins., 178 F.3d 943, 944-45 (7th Cir. 1999).166. See id. at 945 (“[T]he public at large pays for the courts and therefore has an interestin what goes on at all stages of a judicial proceeding. That interest does not always trump theproperty and privacy interests of the litigants, but it can be overridden only if the latterinterests predominate in the particular case.” (citations omitted)).167. See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d. Cir. 1984). 
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 69lic.168 If so, the court could order that certain information be sealedfrom the public and third parties.169Nevro Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp. serves as a reminder thatfederal litigation is a public process, and that attorneys who filefrivolous sealing requests could be sanctioned.170 The NorthernDistrict of California made it clear that potential embarrassment toa company is not sufficient grounds for sealing documents thatshould otherwise be available to the public.171 After denying arequest to seal documents, the court warned both parties thatfrivolous requests would result in sanctions.172 The defendants againfiled another frivolous request, and the court issued an order toshow cause why the lawyers should not be sanctioned.173 The NinthCircuit’s decision in Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu,which held that there must be “compelling reasons” to seal docu-ments, guided the court.174 The Nevro court noted that:At the hearing on the order to show cause, there was discussionof the fact that attorneys—particularly attorneys for corporateclients—are under great pressure to file motions to seal informa-tion that their clients would prefer to keep secret, even if thereis no legitimate basis to keep the information secret. This is nodoubt a significant issue for corporate lawyers, but the answeris not to file frivolous sealing requests. The answer is to firmlyexplain to their clients that litigation is a public process, andthat the public has the right to know what the litigation isabout, subject only to very limited exceptions.175The court concluded that there was no justification for the sealingrequest, and the request was objectively frivolous in violation ofRule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.176
168. See id. at 1071-72.169. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 727 F.3d 1214, 1224-25 (Fed. Cir. 2013)(sealing product-specific financial information from public disclosure).170. 312 F. Supp. 3d 804, 804-05 (N.D. Cal. 2018).171. See id. at 805. 172. See id. at 804-05. 173. See id. at 805. 174. 447 F.3d 1172, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2006).175. Nevro Corp., 312 F. Supp. 3d at 805.176. See id. 
70 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045Lyft, Inc. v. City of Seattle, addressed the Washington state PublicRecords Act and whether it was appropriate to grant an injunctionpreventing disclosure of records regarding car rides provided in eachzip code within the city.177 Following an evidentiary hearing, theKing County Superior Court had found that these records, weretrade secrets pursuant to the UTSA.178 The issue before the Wash-ington Supreme Court was whether records containing trade secretsare “categorically excluded from public disclosure under the [PublicRecords Act].”179 Lyft had agreed to “submit quarterly standardizedreports to the City that included the total number of rides, thepercentage of rides completed in each zip code, pick-up and drop-offzip codes, the percentage of rides requested but unfulfilled, collisiondata, and the number of requested rides for accessible vehicles.”180In response to Lyft’s concerns regarding the confidentiality of someof the information, the Seattle City Council enacted an ordinancethat provided that if a public records request were made fordocuments that had been designated as confidential, the City wouldinform the owner of the records request prior to disclosure.181Accordingly, when a resident of Texas submitted a public recordsrequest to the City, Lyft sought an injunction to prevent disclosureof the requested reports.182 The court reasoned that no provision ofthe Public Records Act exempted trade secrets from disclosure, andtherefore any exemption would need to be pursuant to anotherstatute (in this case, the UTSA).183 Yet, according to the court, the“UTSA contains no specific exemption of trade secrets from publicdisclosure laws.”184 The court began its UTSA analysis by determin-ing whether the data at issue qualified for trade secret protectionunder the UTSA.185 It concluded that the zip code reports consti-tuted “a compilation of information consistent with the UTSA.”186However, the court reasoned that the UTSA authorized an injunc-
177. 418 P.3d 102, 104 (Wash. 2018). 178. See id. at 106.179. Id. at 110; see generally WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56 (2018). 180. Lyft, Inc., 418 P.3d at 105.181. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 6.310.540(D) (2014).182. Lyft, Inc., 418 P.3d at 106. 183. See id. at 106-07. 184. Id. at 108. 185. See id. at 108-09. 186. Id. at 109.
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 71tion only when there had been an actual or threatened misappropri-ation of trade secrets.187 Therefore, “the City owed no legal duty tomaintain the confidentiality of the public records,” and did not haveauthority to promise confidentiality in any manner that was in-consistent with the Public Records Act.188 The case was thereforeremanded back to the trial court for a fact-based determination ofwhether injunctive relief was warranted under the “more stringentin junction standards” of the Public Records Act, rather than the“lesser UTSA standard” involving misappropriation between privateparties.189The Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Industrial WarehouseServices., Inc., reviewed whether a party was entitled to a protectiveorder in response to a discovery request.190 A trucking company thatwas sued as a result of injuries that occurred in an auto accidentinvolving a truck driven by one of its employees was seeking a pro-tective order.191 As part of the personal injury litigation, the estatesof the parties who died from injuries incurred as a result of theaccident sent discovery requests to the trucking company.192 Inresponse, the trucking company sought a protective order to prohibitdissemination “of its bills of lading and its operations and safetymanuals.”193 The circuit court denied the motion for protective order,finding that the company failed to establish good cause under Rule26(c) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.194 The company ar-gued, however, that the information sought contained confidentialand trade secret information.195 The Alabama Supreme Court foundthat the safety manuals were not trade secrets because the companywas required by federal law to report some of the information fromthese sources to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.196Furthermore, the information in the operations and safety manualscontained information based on regulations that were applicable to
187. See id. at 110. 188. Id. at 111.189. Id. at 114.190. Nos. 1170013 & 1170087, 2018 WL 1126576, at *1 (Ala. Mar. 2, 2018).191. See id. at *1-2. 192. See id. 193. Id. 194. Id. at *2. 195. See id. 196. See id. at *4-5. 
72 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045the entire trucking industry, and were readily ascertainable frompublic sources.197 As to the information contained in the bills oflading, the court ruled that that information satisfied the definitionof a trade secret.198J. DamagesThe UTSA provides that “actual loss caused by misappropriationand the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is nottaken into account in computing actual loss” can all be included asa measure for trade secret damages.199 Accordingly, a trade secretplaintiff may recover both actual losses and the “unjust benefit”caused by the defendant.200 While compensatory damages can becombined with injunctive relief, the UTSA cautions that “injunctiverelief ordinarily will preclude a monetary award for a period inwhich the injunction is effective.”201When there is evidence that the defendant used or disclosed thetrade secret, thus causing actual harm, an award of compensatorydamages is justified.202 The measure of damages in these circum-stances is “likely to be the actual and potential value of the tradesecrets” to the plaintiff’s without the disclosure.203 A number of dif-ferent measures are available to establish compensatory damages.These include lost profits, erosion of market share, out-of-pocketexpenses, and advantage to the defendant.204Title Source Inc. v. HouseCanary Inc.,from a Texas state court,was one of the largest jury verdicts of 2018, with a total of over $706million in compensatory and punitive damages.205 This case de-
197. See id. at *5.198. See id. 199. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).200. Id. § 3 cmt.201. Id.202. See id. 203. SANDEEN & ROWE, supra note 19, at 258-59.204. See, e.g., Univ. Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 536 (5th Cir.1974); Synergeering Group, L.L.C. v. Jonatzke (In re Jonatzke), 478 B.R. 846, 861 (Bankr.E.D. Mich. 2012). 205. Eric J. Fues & Maximilienne Giannelli, Title Source Inc. v. HouseCanary Inc., FIN-NEGAN (May 29, 2018), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/title-source-inc.-v.-housecanary-inc.html [https://perma.cc/FQ4J-AUG4].
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 73serves attention not only because of the high damages award, butbecause the damages went to the defendant on its counterclaimagainst the plaintiff.206 The plaintiff, Title Source, filed suit againstHouseCanary, “alleging nonperformance under the license agree-ment and breach of the [nondisclosure agreement].”207 HouseCanarythen counterclaimed for misappropriation of trade secrets, breachof contract, and fraud.208 The defendant’s tremendous success on itscounterclaim against the plaintiff serves as a note of caution toplaintiffs to be careful what they start, especially when filingactions potentially involving trade secrets.209On a motion for summary judgment, the court in Repat, Inc. v.IndieWhip, L.L.C., entered summary judgment in favor of thedefendants because the plaintiff was unable to show proof of dam-ages.210 The plaintiff argued that there was evidence of threateneduse by virtue of the fact that the defendant had an incentive toexploit what it was able to learn from the plaintiff’s trade secrets.211The court noted that while this argument might have been persua-sive at the beginning of the litigation, two years had passed andplaintiff’s business continued to thrive.212 “If [plaintiff] can find nomaterial evidence (direct or indirect) today that [defendant] hasmade use of its proprietary marketing secrets in the interval, thecourt is hard pressed to understand the nature of the ‘imminent andirreparable harm’ that it is being asked to enjoin.”213 Therefore,plaintiff could not “show any dispute of material fact over actualdamages, present or future, [and] failed to carry its burden of proof”on the trade secrets claim.214The issue of disgorgement and whether it could be decided by ajury arose in two cases. First, the Ninth Circuit briefly addresseddisgorgement in GSI Technology, Inc. v. United Memories, Inc.,noting that profit disgorgement was an equitable remedy to be de-
206. See id. 207. Id. 208. See id. 209. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe, Unpacking Trade Secret Damages, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 155,195-96 (2017) (providing empirical data on the size of trade secret damage awards).210. 281 F. Supp. 3d 221, 223-24 (D. Mass. 2017).211. See id. at 231. 212. See id. at 231-32. 213. Id. at 232.214. Id. 
74 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045cided by the trial court and not by the jury.215 Second, in Texas Ad-vanced Optoelectronic Solutions, Inc. v. Renesas Electronics America,Inc., the Federal Circuit engaged in some historical analysis todetermine whether disgorgement of profits was available at law in1791 for trade secret misappropriation; the Federal Circuit con-cluded that it was not.216 The jury in this case awarded disgorge-ment profits to the plaintiff based on what the plaintiff’s expert hadproposed.217 The evidence supporting this claim for monetary reliefdid not limit the covered sales to a “head-start period.”218 The courtfound that the absence of any limitation to a “head-start” could havehad significant consequences.219 If the disgorgement claim could nothave been brought in the law courts in 1791, then no right to a jurytrial would attach to that claim, and the plaintiff would not have theconstitutional right for a jury to decide the disgorgement question.220The court in In re Mandel concluded that compensatory damagesin a trade secret case could be established with a flexible approach,and a plaintiff should be given latitude to prove damages oncemisappropriation has been shown.221 That being said, however, theplaintiffs were required to produce enough credible evidence to show“the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable in-ference, even if the result be only approximate.”222 The dissentcautioned, however, that “[o]ur flexible and creative standard is nota license for pie-in-the-sky damages; rather, damages must begrounded both in theory and fact.”223The New York Court of Appeals in E.J. Brooks Co. v. CambridgeSecurity Seals, held that a plaintiff cannot recover compensatorydamages measured by the cost a defendant avoided due to itsunlawful activity.224 Reviewing a question from the United StatesCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit, as to whether “under NewYork law, a plaintiff asserting claims of misappropriation of a trade
215. 721 F. App’x 591, 594 (9th Cir. 2017).216. 888 F.3d 1322, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2018).217. See id. at 1336. 218. See id. 219. See id. at 1336-37. 220. See id. at 1337. 221. 720 F. App’x 186, 190-91 (5th Cir. 2018).222. Id. at 191 (internal quotations omitted).223. Id. at 199.224. No. 26, 2018 WL 2048724, at *1 (N.Y. May 3, 2018).
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 75secret, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment can recoverdamages that are measured by the costs the defendant avoided dueto its unlawful activity,” the court answered the question in thenegative.225 In the underlying case, “the jury returned a verdictfinding [the defendant] liable for trade secret misappropriation,unfair competition and unjust enrichment,” and assessing $1.3million in compensatory damages on each claim (totaling $3.9million).226 The defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law,arguing that “avoided costs was an improper measure ofdamages.”227 The trial court denied the motion, holding that avoidedcosts could either measure the defendant’s gains or the plaintiff’slosses.228 The Court of Appeals of New York agreed with thedefendant “that damages in trade secret actions must be measuredby the losses incurred by the plaintiff,” and that they may not bebased on the infringers avoided development costs.229 Damages tiedto the defendant’s gains rather than the plaintiff’s losses were nota permissible measure of damages.230 Recognizing that loss wasbroadly defined in trade secret cases, the court noted, however, thatit was “neither automatically nor presumptively the case that costsavoided by the defendant will be an adequate approximation of theplaintiff’s investment losses, any more than it can be presumed thatthe defendant’s sales would approximate those of the plaintiff.”231The court further noted that the plaintiff’s actual costs were a bettermeasure than the defendant’s, as the plaintiff’s actual developmentcosts had been incurred and were a known quantity, while the de-fendants avoided costs were merely hypothetical.232In Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. Shale Exploration, L.L.C., the TexasCourt of Appeals addressed whether the economic loss rule barredrecovery for misappropriation of trade secrets.233 A jury found thedefendant liable for trade secret misappropriation, and awarded the
225. Id.226. Id. at *2. 227. See id. 228. See id. 229. Id. at *6. 230. See id.231. Id. 232. See id.233. No. 01-15-00888-CV, 2018 WL 1870081, at *1 (Tex. App. Apr. 19, 2018).
76 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045plaintiff “$14,300,000 in lost profits and $4,500,000 in exemplarydamages”.234 The defendant argued that the economic loss rulebarred the plaintiff’s misappropriation claim because it was basedon a confidentiality agreement and was thus recognizable only as acontract claim.235 In this case, the plaintiff sought to recover lostprofits under both breach of a confidentiality agreement and mis-appropriation of trade secrets.236 The court noted that “the breachof a confidential relationship may be a breach of contract and resultin contractual liability, but a breach of confidence also gives rise toan independent claim for misappropriation of trade secrets,regardless of contractual liability.”237 Accordingly, the court heldthat “if the evidence is sufficient to show the elements of the tort ofmisappropriation of trade secrets” independent from a contractualobligation, the economic loss rule does not bar the misappropriationclaim.238K. Permanent Injunctive ReliefIn the absence of provable monetary damages (and often in ad-dition thereto), the principal remedy for trade secret misappropria-tion is likely to be permanent injunctive relief.239 According to theDTSA, such relief may be granted to enjoin actual or threatenedtrade secret misappropriation “on such terms as the court deemsreasonable,” including with respect to the length of the injunction.240The USTA limits the length of permanent injunctive relief intrade secret cases to the period of time during which the subjecttrade secrets remain secret.241 Presumably, the same limitation willapply under the DTSA, but it remains to be seen whether, and towhat extent, federal courts rely upon state rules and decisions onthis issue, and what federal courts will determine to be reasonable.
234. Id. 235. See id. at *5. 236. See id. at *17. 237. Id. at *5. 238. Id. at *6.239. See Rowe, supra note 209, at 195. 240. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2016); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a)(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).241. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a).
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 77Once a plaintiff in a trade secret case proves misappropriation,particularly in a UTSA jurisdiction or in a DTSA case, the plaintiffmay argue that they are “automatically” entitled to injunctive reliefbecause such relief is a statutorily prescribed remedy.242 Whetherthis argument will work depends upon the law of the applicablestate and how the federal courts interpret and apply the DTSA.243There is nothing in the language of the UTSA or DTSA thatspecifically requires courts to apply “principles of equity,” as was thecase with patent law in the eBay case.244 However, consistent withthe common law origins of trade secret law, the grant of permanentinjunctive relief is ordinarily subject to principles of equity.245Applicable law and the facts of each case will dictate the equitablefactors on which courts focus when deciding whether to grant per-manent injunctive relief.246The Federal Circuit in CardiAQ Valve Technologies, Inc. v.Neovasc Inc., upheld the denial of a permanent injunction becausethe requested injunction would have been duplicative of the mon-etary relief received by the plaintiff.247 The district court below alsohad considered the uncertainty in the market, the impact theinjunction would have had on the defendant, and “the public’sinterest in having access to a potentially life-saving technology.”248In TMRJ Holdings, Inc. v. Inhance Technologies., L.L.C., a courtof appeals in Texas reviewed whether a trial court erred in award-ing both damages and permanent injunctive relief.249 The defendantagainst whom the injunction was entered argued that the two rem-edies were duplicative, and that awarding both violated the one-satisfaction rule.250 The jury awarded “$4 million in reasonableroyalty-damages and $10,500 in lost profits” to the plaintiff.251 The
242. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., No. 3:09cv58, 2012 WL4490547, at *5, *12 (E.D. Va. Aug. 30, 2012).243. See id. 244. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-94 (2006).245. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 2012 WL 4490547, at *4-5, *7, *12, *16, *22-23. 246. See id. 247. 708 F. App’x 654, 667-69 (Fed. Cir. 2017).248. Id. at 667. 249. 540 S.W.3d 202, 204-05 (Tex. App. 2018).250. See id. at 205. 251. Id. at 204. 
78 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045trial court entered judgment on those damages and also granted apermanent injunction.252 In reviewing whether the reasonable roy-alty damages overlapped with the permanent injunction thatprohibited future use of the trade secrets, the court reasoned thatthe reasonable royalty damages did not make the plaintiff whole.253That is because the reasonable royalty damages awarded by the jurywere not based on actual future use of the trade secret, but weremeant to compensate purely for the misappropriation of the tech-nology.254 The present value of the technology was “based in part onpotential for future use, regardless of whether that use came tofruition.”255 In addition, the court found that the evidence at trialshowed that the plaintiff never intended the trade secrets to becommercially available; thus, they were never intended to be li-censed or otherwise used by a third-party.256 Accordingly, a reason-able royalty would not fully compensate for misappropriation of atrade secret that the owner seeks to preserve for its exclusive useand would not sell.257 The court further found that although theroyalty determination conceivably included future revenue thatlicensing the trade secrets might have produced, “the trial courtreasonably could have concluded that this measure of actualdamages did not fully compensate [the plaintiff] absent an injunc-tion because [the plaintiff] never intended that the trade secrets beavailable in the marketplace.”258L. DTSA Whistleblower ProvisionThe newest defense to a trade secret misappropriation claim isprovided by a provision of the DTSA which applies to all potentialcriminal and civil trade secret liability, state or federal.259 Thisdefense is known as the “whistleblower immunity” or “whistleblower
252. See id. at 204-05.253. See id. at 210. 254. See id. 255. Id. 256. See id. 257. See id. 258. Id. at 211.259. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b) (Supp. IV 2016).
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 79defense,” and it specifies that certain disclosures of trade secretscannot serve as the basis of a trade secret claim.260There are three parts to the DTSA’s whistleblower provision.Subsections (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B) set forth the applicable im-munity, stating that it applies in two situations.261 First, when a“disclosure” of trade secrets is made “in confidence” to specifiedgovernment officials, and “solely for the purpose of reporting orinvestigating a suspected violation of law.”262 Second, when thedisclosure “is made in a complaint or other document filed” in alegal proceeding, and is filed “under seal,” presumably in accordancewith the rules of the applicable court.263Subsection (b)(2) concerns the use of trade secrets in retaliationlawsuits, allowing trade secrets to be disclosed by the plaintiff to hisor her attorney, provided that the trade secrets are kept confidentialand, if filed with the court, are filed under seal.264Subsection (b)(3) does not immunize disclosures, but may affectthe availability of remedies in a trade secret misappropriation casebecause it requires employers to give a specified notice to theiremployees.265 If they fail to do so, “the employer may not be awardedexemplary damages or attorney fees under subparagraph (C) or (D)of section 1836(b)(3) in an action against an employee to whomnotice was not provided.”266 Significantly, “employee” is definedbroadly for purposes of the whistleblower immunity to include “anyindividual performing work as a contractor or consultant for anemployer.”267The first year of the DTSA had few reported decisions involvingthe whistleblower immunity, but one case where it arose sparkedconcerns about how the provision is being interpreted and ap-plied.268 In Unum Group. v. Loftus, the court considered a Motion toDismiss based upon the whistleblower immunity and refused to
260. See id.; see also Peter S. Menell, Misconstruing Whistleblower Immunity Under theDefend Trade Secrets Act, 1 NEV. L.J.F. 92, 93-94 (2017). 261. See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1)(A)-(B).262. Id. § 1833(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).263. Id. § 1833(b)(1)(B).264. Id. § 1833(b)(2)(A).265. Id. § 1833(b)(3)(A)-(D).266. Id. § 1833(b)(3)(C).267. Id. § 1833 (b)(4). 268. See Menell, supra note 260, at 94-97. 
80 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045grant it, ruling that application of the immunity required findingsof fact that could not be determined on a Motion to Dismiss.269 Thissparked concern by the author of the DTSA provision that theimmunity is being treated like an affirmative defense that adefendant must plead and prove, rather than as an immunity thatcan be raised in a Motion to Dismiss.270The whistleblower provision was subsequently applied in Chris-tian v. Lannett Co.271 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania dis-missed the defendant’s federal counterclaims for trade secretmisappropriation against the plaintiff.272 A former employee suedthe defendant pharmaceutical company for discrimination, and thecompany counterclaimed, alleging that the former employee hadtransferred 22,000 pages of company documents to her attorney andhad retained company trade secrets after her employment wasterminated.273 However, the court found that those documents fellwithin the immunized disclosure parameters defined by the DTSA:Plaintiff’s alleged disclosure was made to Plaintiff’s counselpursuant to a discovery Order of this Court, within the contextof a lawsuit regarding violations of Title VII, the ADA, and theFMLA. Therefore, said disclosure to counsel cannot be used toallege a continuing misappropriation of the documents acquiredbefore the DTSA enactment date.274The DTSA requires employers to provide notice of its whistleblow-er immunity provisions.275 Failure to do so prevents recovery ofattorney’s fees or exemplary damages.276 In Xoran Holdings L.L.C.v. Luick, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, again interpretingthe DTSA, applied the whistleblower immunity provision to bar theplaintiff from recovering attorney’s fees or exemplary damages on
269. 220 F. Supp. 3d 143, 146 (D. Mass. 2016).270. See Peter S. Menell, Misconstruing Whistleblower Immunity Under the Defend TradeSecrets Act, THE CLS. BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 3, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/01/03/misconstruing-whistleblower-immunity-under-the-defend-trade-secrets-act [https://perma.cc/3S3P-GR7L].271. No. CV-16-963, 2018 WL 1532849 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2018). 272. See id. at *1.273. See id. at *1-2. 274. Id. at *4.275. See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 2016).276. Id. § 1833(b)(3)(C). 
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 81its DTSA claim because it had not provided notice of the whistle-blower immunity provision in its employment agreement or any-where else.277 II. CRIMINAL UPDATEThe Economic Espionage Act (EEA) is the federal statutecriminalizing trade secret misappropriation and espionage.278 TheEEA gives federal authorities, including the US Department ofJustice and local federal prosecutors, “the power to investigate andprosecute individuals or companies who engage in criminal tradesecret misappropriation.”279 Considering “the indictments that havebeen brought under the EEA, the vast majority of prosecutionsinvolve employees, former employees, and other company‘insiders.’”280 However, acts of corporate espionage by outsiders arealso covered by the EEA.281The EEA contains two main sections that address specificallytheft of trade secrets to benefit a foreign government (section 1831),and more generally, all other theft of trade secrets (section 1832).282Section 1832 is the more widely utilized section, and it prohibitsintentionally or knowingly “convert[ing] a trade secret that is re-lated to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstateor foreign commerce.”283 It is worth noting that a defendant can beprosecuted under the EEA even if no trade secrets were actuallystolen.284 That is because both section 1831 and 1832 “make anattempt to steal trade secrets and a conspiracy to steal trade secretsa crime.”285The EEA also has extraterritorial reach and can be applied evenwhere conduct does not occur on U.S. soil.286 Section 1837 extends
277. No. 16-13703, 2017 WL 4039178, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2017).278. Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-269, 126 Stat. 2442 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2012)). 279. Rowe, supra note 86, at 387; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1831. 280. Rowe, supra note 86, at 387. 281. Id. 282. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831, 1832.283. Id. § 1832(a).284. See Rowe, supra note 86, at 388.285. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)(4)-(5), 1832 (a)(4)-(5).286. See 18 U.S.C. § 1837; see also Rowe, supra note 86, at 394.
82 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045jurisdiction if (a) the defendant is a U.S. citizen or corporation, or (b)any “act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the UnitedStates.”287 In practice, this provision has not been widely used byprosecutors due to the accompanying challenges of enforcement andservice in foreign countries.288The penalties under the EEA include both fines and prisonsentences.289 Violations under section 1831 may result in fines of upto $5 million for individuals, and up to $10 million or three timesthe value of the trade secrets for organizations.290 The maximumterm of imprisonment is fifteen years.291 The DTSA increased thefinancial penalties for organizations from a maximum of $5 millionto the greater of $5 million or three times the value of the tradesecrets.292 For individuals, the prison term is ten years.293Overall, the number of prosecutions under the EEA have beenrelatively low since its enactment in 1996.294 The past year hasproduced a steady pace of activity relating to federal criminal tradesecret offenses.295 Headlines from a number of convictions and in-dictments from the past year are highlighted below.296 It is worthobserving that these cases of espionage often involve well-knowncompanies, high-level employees,297 and competitors seeking to ac-quire technology.298
287. 18 U.S.C. § 1837.288. See Rowe, supra note 86, at 394. 289. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)-(b).290. Id.291. Id. § 1831(a).292. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(b) (Supp. IV 2016).293. Id. § 1831(a) (2012).294. THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH, THE COMMISSION ON THE THEFT OFAMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, THE IP COMMISSION REPORT 43 (May 2013), http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_ 052213.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG42-YUMX]. 295. See infra Parts II.A, II.B. 296. See infra Parts II.A, II.B. 297. In an upcoming article I will explore this phenomenon of scientists, engineers, andexecutives as criminals under the EEA.298. See infra Part II.A, II.B. 
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 83A. Convictions1. Former DuPont Employee Pleads GuiltyJosh Harry Isler admitted that while employed with DuPont, heaccepted employment with a competitor of DuPont in the ethanolfuel enzyme business.299 While still employed with DuPont, andafter accepting his new employment, Isler downloaded proprietaryinformation and trade secrets belonging to DuPont, and many of thefiles related to DuPont’s customers, who were also potential cus-tomers of his new employer.3002. Jury Convicts Electrical Engineer for Theft from DefenseContractorOn July 9, 2018, a jury in Hartford, Connecticut found JaredDylan Sparks, an electrical engineer who worked for a defensecontractor (LBI, Inc.), guilty of trade secret theft.301 LBI “designedand built unmanned underwater vehicles” for the Navy.302 Sparksleft LBI to work for Charles River Analytics.303 Before leaving,Sparks uploaded thousands of LBL files to his Dropbox account,which included accounting and engineering files, as well as photosrelated to designs and renderings used to make the unmanned un-derwater vehicles.304
299. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former DuPont Employee Pleads Guilty toStealing Trade Secrets and Lying to the FBI (July 11, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndia/pr/former-dupont-employee-pleads-guilty-stealing-trade-secrets-and-lying-fbi [http://perma.cc/ 3JZ9-YF9Y].300. See id. 301. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Electrical Engineer Found Guilty for In-tending to Convert Trade Secrets from Defense Contractor (July 10, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/electrical-engineer-found-guilty-intending-convert-trade-secrets-defense-contractor [http://perma.cc/JWD4-336X].302. Id. 303. See id. 304. See id. 
84 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:0453. Sinovel Convicted and Fined for Theft from AMSCA jury in Madison, Wisconsin convicted Sinovel Wind Group ofconspiracy to commit trade secret theft from AMSC.305 “Sinovel stoleproprietary wind turbine technology from AMSC” to produce its ownturbines.306 The “[c]ourt found that AMSC’s losses from the theftexceeded $550 million.”307 Sinovel received the statutory maximumfine of $1.5 million and one year probation.308 The company was alsoordered to pay restitution of about $57 million.3094. Former Chemours Employee Pleads GuiltyOn June 8, 2018, Jerry Jindong Xu, a Canadian citizen, pledguilty to conspiracy to steal trade secrets related to sodium cyanidefrom The Chemours Company.310 Chemours was formed in 2015from DuPont’s chemicals business, and the company “performs theresearch and development for sodium cyanide products.”311 Xu pre-viously worked for DuPont in China.312 He admitted to, among otherthings, misleading his colleagues in order to accumulate pricinginformation, using personal email accounts to transfer confidentialinformation, using an “encrypted Chinese-based messaging serviceto communicate with his co-conspirators,” and receiving informationfrom a “Chinese investor who indicated that it is common practicein China to steal technology from others.”313
305. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Court Imposes Maximum Fine on SinovelWind Group for Theft of Trade Secrets (July 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/court-imposes-maximum-fine-sinovel-wind-group-theft-trade-secrets [http://perma.cc/V68C-RK5R].306. Id. 307. Id. 308. See id. 309. See id. 310. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Chemours Employee Pleads Guiltyto Theft of Trade Secrets Conspiracy in Bid to Lure Chinese Investors into Sodium CyanideMarket (June 12, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-de/pr/former-chemours-employee-pleads-guilty-theft-trade-secrets-conspiracy-bid-lure-chinese [http://perma.cc/2MNT-ZC2S].311. Id. 312. See id. 313. Id. 
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 855. Scientist Convicted for Theft of Engineered RiceWeiqiang Zhang was convicted in February 2017 for acquiring,without authorization, genetically programmed rice seeds which areused in the therapeutic and medical fields.314 These seeds havevarious applications in health research, and Ventria, the defen-dant’s former employer, spent millions of dollars finding cost-effective methods to extract proteins from the rice seeds.315 Zhangprovided the seeds to representatives of a Chinese crop institutewhen they visited him at his home in Manhattan, Kansas.316 He wassentenced to 121 months in prison.3176. Developer Pleads Guilty and Sentenced to Five Years inPrisonXu Jiaqiang pled guilty to stealing proprietary source code fromhis former employer to benefit the National Health and FamilyPlanning Commission of the People’s Republic of China.318 Thedefendant worked as a developer for the company and had access tothe underlying source code.319 At various times, the defendant com-municated with two undercover officers who posed as a financialinvestor and a project manager, respectively.320 He also uploadedproprietary source code to a server set up by the FBI.321 He wassentenced to five years in prison.322
314. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Chinese Scientist Sentenced to Prison inTheft of Engineered Rice (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-scientist-sentenced-prison-theft-engineered-rice [http://perma.cc/6RLS-JFJZ].315. See id. 316. See id. 317. See id. 318. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Chinese National Sentenced for Economic Es-pionage and Theft of a Trade Secret from U.S. Company (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www. justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-sentenced-economic-espionage-and-theft-trade-secret-us-company[http://perma.cc/8G57-LDAT].319. See id. 320. See id. 321. See id. 322. See id. 
86 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:0457. Former Executive Convicted for Trade Secret Theft fromMedical CompanyChristopher Barry, former Vice President of Research andDevelopment for Lutonix, Inc., pled guilty to theft of trade secretsfor the benefit of his new employer, a startup medical devicecompany.323 The defendant had been “responsible for all researchand development, quality assurance, and manufacturing” for hisformer employer.324 He stole trade secret files in order to use theproprietary information in connection with his new employment andto transfer those files to his new employer.325 He was sentenced totwelve months and one day in prison, three years supervisedrelease, and is required to pay $533,842 in restitution.3268. Chicago Trader Convicted for Theft of His Employer’sTrading CodeDavid Newman pled guilty to theft of trade secrets for down-loading and stealing “all of the proprietary computer code and trad-ing software belonging to his employer,” WH Trading LLC.327 Heapparently downloaded over 400,000 files to multiple USB thumbdrives and then resigned from the company to establish his owntrading firm.328 He intended to use the stolen trade secrets tocompete with his former employer.329 Proprietary codes are used for“pricing futures and options contracts, executing trades on variousexchanges, analyzing the risk of trades, and interpreting exchange
323. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Lutonix Executive Sentenced to aYear and a Day in Prison for Stealing Trade Secrets (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/former-lutonix-executive-sentenced-year-and-day-prison-stealing-trade-secrets[http://perma.cc/G3X4-RTBF].324. Id. 325. See id. 326. Id. 327. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Chicago Trader Sentenced to a Year in FederalPrison for Stealing Proprietary Trading Secrets from His Employer (June 5, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/chicago-trader-sentenced-year-federal-prison-stealing-proprietary-trading-secrets-his [https://perma.cc/GVY3-BMKM].328. See id. 329. See id. 
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 87market data.”330 He was sentenced to one year and one day in prisonand fined $100,000.3319. Engineer Pleads Guilty to Selling Secrets to Russian SpyGregory Allen Justice pled guilty to “selling sensitive satelliteinformation to a person he believed to be an agent of a Russian in-telligence service.”332 Justice was an engineer who worked for adefense contractor on military and commercial satellite programs.333After stealing the proprietary trade secrets from his employer,Justice provided them to an undercover FBI agent who he believedwas a Russian agent.334 He received thousands of dollars in cashpayments in exchange for the proprietary trade secrets.335B. Indictments1. Six Former and Current Fitbit Employees IndictedOn June 14, 2018, six former and current Fitbit employees wereindicted in the Northern District of California for alleged federaltrade secret offenses.336 The individuals are accused of either steal-ing market research regarding fitness tracker opportunities fromJawbone, or stealing internal studies—including a comparison studyof consumer behavior in which consumers wore both Jawbone andFitbit devices.337 The employees were charged with felony “posses-
330. Id. 331. See id. 332. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Defense Contractor Employee Pleads Guilty toSelling Satellite Secrets to Undercover Agent Posing as Russian Spy (May 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/defense-contractor-employee-pleads-guilty-selling-satellite-secrets-undercover-agent-posing-0 [https://perma.cc/AQ5J-BXTT].333. See id. 334. See id. 335. See id. 336. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Six Former and Current Fitbit EmployeesIndicted for Possessing Multiple Trade Secrets Stolen from Jawbone (June 14, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/six-former-and-current-fitbit-employees-indicted-possessing-multiple-trade-secrets [https://perma.cc/AE2R-BC48].337. See id. 
88 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045sion of stolen trade secrets, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(3),”for which the maximum sentence is 10 years in prison.338This indictment is particularly interesting because in 2015, Jaw-bone sued Fitbit, including these same individuals, “for ‘systemati-cally plundering’ trade secrets, including over 300,000 confidentialfiles.”339 After a nine-day trial, the International Trade Commission(ITC) ruled in favor of Fitbit and the individuals.340 The administra-tive law judge determined on the merits that “no Jawbone tradesecrets were misappropriated or used in any Fitbit product.”341Nevertheless, U.S. federal prosecutors decided to move forward witha criminal prosecution.342 The indictment states that the defendants“received and possessed one or more of the trade secrets for theeconomic benefit of someone other than Jawbone ... [and] eachdefendant was aware following his or her departure from Jawbonethat the trade secrets were stolen and that they were being pos-sessed without authorization.”343 This criminal case is worth fol-lowing to see how it unfolds in light of the findings in the ITCproceeding.2. Former Apple Employee IndictedOn July 12, 2018, a grand jury in San Jose indicted XiaolangZhang for allegedly taking “a confidential 25-page document con-taining detailed schematic drawings of a circuit board designed tobe used ... in an autonomous vehicle.”344 Zhang told Apple that hewas resigning from his job to return to China to be closer to hismother, but they subsequently learned that he was going to work for
338. Id. 339. Shannon Liao, Feds Charged Six Current and Former Fitbit Employees for StealingTrade Secrets From Jawbone, THE VERGE (June 15, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/2018/6/15/17467820/fitbit-employees-charged-stolen-jawbone-trade-secrets-jawbone[https://perma.cc/SPB2-YTNY].340. See id. 341. Id. 342. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Six Former and Current Fitbit Employees Indicted forPossessing Multiple Trade Secrets Stolen from Jawbone, supra note 336. 343. See id. 344. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Apple Employee Indicted on Theft ofTrade Secrets (July 16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/former-apple-employee-indicted-theft-trade-secrets [https://perma.cc/T6PS-QTFW].
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 89a Chinese company “focused on electric automobiles and autono-mous vehicle technology.”345 After the company discovered thatZhang had allegedly downloaded information from project databasescontaining trade secrets, Federal agents intercepted and arrestedhim at the San Jose International Airport.3463. Man Arrested for Attempting to Steal Trade Secrets fromMedrobotics Corp.Dong Liu, a dual citizen of China and Canada, was arrested andcharged with attempting to steal trade secrets from MedroboticsCorporation, headquartered in Raynham, Massachusetts.347 Med-robotics manufactures a robot-assisted device used by surgeons toaccess “hard-to-reach places in the human body for minimally in-vasive surgery.”348 He was arrested after being caught by the CEOof Medrobotics sitting in a conference room at the company withthree open laptop computers.349 He was not authorized to be on thepremises and he gave conflicting explanations for why he hadentered the building.3504. Man Indicted for Stealing Trade Secrets to Benefit RivalFirm in ChinaRobert O’Rourke had worked for a Woodstock-based manufac-turer of cast-iron products since 1984.351 In 2015, O’Rourke allegedlybegan discussions with a Chinese company to take a similar positionas vice president with the Chinese company.352 According to the
345. Id. 346. See id. 347. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Dual Canadian/Chinese Citizen Arrested forAttempting to Steal Trade Secrets and Computer Information (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/dual-canadianchinese-citizen-arrested-attempting-steal-trade-secrets-and-computer [https://perma.cc/9386-6ENA].348. Id. 349. See id. 350. See id. 351. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Businessman Indicted for Allegedly Stealing Em-ployer’s Trade Secrets While Planning for New Job with Rival Firm in China (July 20, 2017),https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/businessman-indicted-allegedly-stealing-employer-s-trade-secrets-while-planning-new-job [https://perma.cc/WM44-7RVF].352. See id. 
90 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 60:045indictment, O’Rourke allegedly took the proprietary informationfrom the Woodstock company and intended to catch a flight fromChicago to China.353 He was arrested at the O’Hare InternationalAirport by federal authorities.3545. Russian Officers Charged for Hacking Yahoo EmailAccountsFour defendants, including two offices of the Russian Federal Se-curity Service (FSB), were indicted by a grand jury in the NorthernDistrict of California in March 2017.355 They allegedly used “un-authorized access to Yahoo’s systems to steal information fromabout at least 500 million Yahoo accounts” and then used the stoleninformation to access other accounts at Google and other webmailproviders.356 Among the accounts accessed were those of Russianjournalists, as well as U.S. and Russian government officials.357Private-sector employees of financial, transportation, and othercompanies were also targeted.3586. Chinese Hackers Charged for Intrusions Against Moody’s,Siemens, and TrimbleThree Chinese nationals were indicted for computer hacking andtheft of trade secrets in November 2017.359 They allegedly conspiredto hack into private corporate servers to steal confidential businessinformation.360 They did so by exploiting employees’ computers andconducting “spearphish” email campaigns to deploy “malicious code”
353. See id. 354. See id. 355. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers and TheirCriminal Conspirators for Hacking Yahoo and Millions of Email Accounts (March 15, 2017),https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-russian-fsb-officers-and-their-criminal-conspirators-hacking-yahoo-and-millions [https://perma.cc/F2TZ-DGPK].356. Id. 357. See id. 358. See id. 359. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Three Chinese Hackers WhoWork at Internet Security Firm for Hacking Three Corporations for Commercial Advantage(Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-three-chinese-hackers-who-work-internet-security-firm-hacking-three-corporations [https://perma.cc/WSH5-5SG7].360. See id. 
2019] SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS 91into the companies’ computer networks.361 The victim companieswere Moody’s Analytics, Siemens AG, and Trimble, Inc.362 The hack-ers worked for the China-based Internet security firm GuangzhouBo Yu Information Technology Company Limited.363CONCLUSIONWe are in the second year following enactment of the federalDTSA, which governs trade secret misappropriation concurrentlywith the state-based UTSA.364 This Article highlighted some note-worthy cases from select federal and state courts during the pastyear, arranged topically to follow the life cycle of a trade secret casefrom filing to damages.365 It is evident that the majority of the casesare still being decided under the UTSA, and that there does not ap-pear to be any significant doctrinal departures in the case law sofar.366 This Article also provided headline updates from the pastyear on criminal convictions and indictments under the EconomicEspionage Act.367 These cases continue to reflect cloak-and-daggerpatterns that involve well-known companies, high-level employees(often foreign citizens), and competitors seeking to acquire technol-ogy.368
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